Peer-Reviewed Articles
With Linan Yao (Vanderbilt)
Forthcoming, Political Communication. [DOI] [Preprint]
For authoritarian propaganda to fulfill its persuasive function, it must first reach the intended audiences and garner their attention. What makes people living under authoritarianism willingly consume some pieces of propaganda but not others? In this article, we examine this question by studying a new genre of propaganda movies in China known as “main melody movies.” Leveraging data on box office performance and a survey experiment, we find that the entertainment value of propaganda movies is key to increasing consumption; the effect is particularly pronounced for groups that are least inclined to consume propaganda in the first place. Moreover, when propaganda can provide entertainment, audiences are less averse to its political indoctrination. These findings highlight the multi-dimensional nature of propaganda and shed light on how authoritarian regimes increase the reach of their propaganda by attracting audiences with various other utilities. They also point to the increasing “Hollywoodization” of propaganda movies in contemporary China.
With Bo Feng (SHUFE) and Qiwei He (Edinburgh)
2026. Labour Economics, 103. [DOI]
This paper investigates how misperceptions about non-monetary and monetary aspects of government jobs affect individuals’ propensity to choose civil service as a career in China. Based on a survey sample of more than 2000 college students in China, we document the prevalence of misperceptions about government jobs in terms of promotion prospects, salary compensation, and housing benefits. When misperceptions are corrected using a survey experiment, we find that individuals who overestimate (underestimate) promotion prospects, salary compensation, and housing benefits significantly decrease (increase) their interest in government jobs; the effects of these corrections are asymmetric based on respondents’ prior misperceptions. Moreover, we find that those who are more prosocial increase (decrease) their interest in government jobs more than others, when their underestimation (overestimation) of promotion prospects is corrected. These results point to the significant impact of individuals’ (mis)perceptions about government jobs on bureaucratic selection, especially in terms of non-monetary aspects such as career prospects.
2024. American Political Science Review, 118(4): pp.1856-1872. [DOI]
Why does an authoritarian regime adopt meritocracy in its political selection? I argue that meritocracy can be used to co-opt large numbers of ordinary citizens by providing them with an opportunity of socioeconomic advancement instead of income redistribution, as long as the selection process is viewed as inclusive and rule-based. Focusing on the civil service examination in contemporary China, I examine how this meritocratic selection has shaped the relationship between college graduates and the Chinese regime. Exploiting a spatial-cohort variation in applicant eligibility, I find that the exam boosts college graduates’ perceived upward mobility, which in turn weakens their demand for redistribution even in the face of growing inequality. These findings point to an alternative mode of authoritarian co-optation and highlight the role of upward mobility in regime stability.
With Chengyuan Ji (SJTU)
2022. Political Communication, 39(1): pp.122-145. [DOI] [Preprint]
For an authoritarian regime, what is the value of providing news on other countries for domestic audience? While it is politically expedient to cover foreign countries negatively, we argue that a regime’s economic interest can motivate it to strategically vary its news coverage; specifically, favorable coverage is given to its close economic partners in order to boost popular support for continued engagement. To test this argument, we examine foreign news coverage by China’s state-run television network between 2003 and 2018. Combining textual and quantitative analyses, we find that countries with stronger economic ties with China receive significantly more favorable news coverage. Moreover, analysis of survey data shows that Chinese public opinion is responsive to such news coverage. The findings demonstrate a pragmatic use of information control by an authoritarian government. It also shows that news media can serve to promote economic openness instead of protectionism.
2019. Political Science Research and Methods, 7(4): pp.853-870. [DOI] [Preprint]
Political selection is important to authoritarian regime survival. Although selection outcomes are often observed, it is difficult to decipher elites’ logic of decision-making due to their multidimensional preference and the opaque process. Employing a conjoint experiment conducted among over 300 government officials in China, this paper unpacks multidimensional elite preference in entry-level political selection. It finds that while elites comply with institutional norms by selecting candidates based on competence and loyalty, they also take into account personal preference by favoring those with political connections. Kinship ties to government increase a candidate’s chance by over 20 percentage points, even though the candidate is not deemed more competent or loyal. These findings demonstrate that authoritarian elites do not always follow the logic of regime survival; there exists an agency problem in political selection that could undermine the effectiveness of the ruling class over time.
Working Papers
With Yesola Kweon (SKKU). Conditionally Accepted, Journal of Politics. [PDF]
This study investigates how the lack of gender representation in political leadership affects public trust in authoritarian regimes. Utilizing a survey experiment in China following the CCP’s unprecedented exclusion of women from its Politburo in 2022, we examine citizen responses across four dimensions of political legitimacy. We find that under-representation of women significantly reduces political trust, specifically when it is framed as an issue of performance and equality legitimacy. In contrast, framing it in terms of ideological or international legitimacy has no effect. Moreover, the penalty in political trust is concentrated among disadvantaged regime outsiders, while insiders remain untroubled. These findings suggest that citizens in authoritarian regimes value descriptive representation instrumentally for its perceived contributions to governance and equality. This study contributes to the scholarship on authoritarian legitimacy and gender politics by showing that the lack of representation can meaningfully erode regime support, particularly when it undermines public expectations of government performance and social equity.
With Yuhua Wang (Harvard). [PDF]
Whether a political system can attract high-quality candidates is a key to produce high-quality politicians. In this article, we examine the issue of candidate pool formation in developing countries where elections are absent. We argue that a government can attract competent individuals to become candidates when it can provide them with significant selectoral advantage. Exploiting a natural experiment in China, where universities adopt an arbitrary score cutoff to enroll students, we show that students attending top elite universities, which en- joy strong alumni networks in politics, are more likely to be interested in a political career than their peers in other universities. Analysis of an original online survey confirms that alumni networks serve as a causal mechanism by enhancing elite university students’ future prospect in political selection. Our study differs from existing research that focuses on the role of election in choosing the “good types” and shows that social networks can serve as an effective instrument to attract the best talents to work for the government.
Work in Progress
(with Justin Canfil)
(with Yu You)